The Two Primary Qualitative Variables For Defining Ports Along International Drug Trafficking Routes
To understand the nature of these expenses and the contexts in which they must be paid, it is necessary to research the dynamics that unfold in ports along international drug trafficking routes.
Any explanation must begin with some basic considerations.
First, international drug trafficking consists of three successive macro phases: production, transportation, and distribution (money flows fall under each).
The transportation macro phase, especially when it includes ocean shipping, yields the highest profits for a single criminal organization. In reality, distribution generates more overall, but the proceeds are divided among multiple traffickers before the drugs reach the end users in small quantities.
Over the past few decades, transportation has become increasingly strategic. Along the route from South America to North America, increased police surveillance has shifted the balance of power between Colombian and Mexican cartels in favour of the latter. Because of the significant risks involved, which determine the corresponding rewards, control of the drug business has partially shifted from those who produce drugs to those who transport them.
At the same time, estimating revenues from ocean transportation—indispensable, at least on the route from South and Central America to Europe—is relatively straightforward.
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The primary negotiation in a major drug deal revolves around the purchase price. A kilogram of pure cocaine purchased directly from South American producers or traffickers ranges in price from approximately $600 for huge shipments (equivalent to several tons) to about $6,000 for shipments of around half a ton.
Basically, as with any other product, the price is determined by the quantity and quality of the purchase, as well as the place of delivery. For instance, cocaine is less expensive in Colombia than in Brazil because the price in Brazil must also compensate for the risks associated with transportation from one country to another.
However, if sea freight is required, additional terms of sale may also be important. Two terms, in particular, are worth mentioning:
The agreed-upon price usually includes delivery on board the departing ship. Consequently, a cost per kilogram is added to the product's price, which is set at, or relatively close to, the production areas. This cost compensates the seller for the additional risks associated with transporting the drugs to the designated port, accessing the port, and loading the cargo onto the ship. For instance, Vincenzo Pasquino (cl. 1990), a ‘Ndrangheta cocaine broker who operated in Brazil until his arrest in the state capital of Paraiba in May 2021 and is now serving as a government witness, revealed to prosecutors the amount of this additional cost for departures from the Port of Santos. In 2018, Pasquino purchased cocaine from the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital; further details on this Brazilian criminal organization's control of the Port of Santos below) “for 5,000–5,500 euros per kilogram, which became 7,000–7,500 euros per kilogram, adding the price of loading." Therefore, the loading stage costs about 35 to 40 percent of the selling price of cocaine and lasts until the ship leaves the port. From that moment on, the seller’s responsibility ends, and the buyer’s begins. (In the above case, the cocaine, destined for the Port of Gioia Tauro, on the Tyrrhenian coast of the Calabria region of Italy, was sold to wholesalers at a fixed price of between 23,000 and 25,000 euros per kilogram.)
The “50 percent system” is often used because it is mutually beneficial to major traffickers and Latin American cartels. It involves the buyer purchasing only 50 percent of the drugs shipped, while the cartel collects the remaining 50 percent from the buyer at the destination to supply its direct distribution network. Essentially, the seller takes advantage of the buyer's extended transportation arrangements (this system can be used even when maritime transportation is not contemplated).
As for resale prices, on the route from South America to Europe, wholesalers at the supply hub of Rotterdam pay between 22,000 and 27,000 euros per kilogram for batches of around 100–50–20 kg.
The following text, for instance, reports messages exchanged via the encrypted messaging service EncroChat, which was cracked by European law enforcement agencies in April 2020. These messages revealed the process of determining the selling price for a 1,200-kilogram shipment of cocaine to wholesalers. A criminal organization, led by the prominent Dutch cocaine trafficker Roger P., known as Piet Costa (cl. 1976), imported the drug in March 2020. Soon after, the exchange of messages between Piet Costa himself (PC), the two top local members of his organization, Hassan M. (HM) and Ibrahim A. (IA), other members of the organization (M1-M2-M3), and a potential buyer of a portion of the stored batch (PB) developed at different times as follows:
(M1) Do you already know something about the price?
(M1) I have someone for 100 kg who might come to check the product later.
(M1) Do you want to sell something? If so, at what price should I tell him for 100 kg?
(HM) I heard it’s good merchandise.
(HM) I will find out what the price is.
(HM) My friend, what are the prices in your area [Rotterdam]?
(M2) At 27k, it sells well. I can sell a lot of it.
(HM) I think I'll set the price at 27.5k
(HM) We're going to set it at 27.5k.
(HM) The price is 27.5k.
(HM) We'll start with 27.5.
(M2) Do you already know what price we're using then?
(HM) Yes, my friend..., 27.5k.
(M3) One last question, it's from Colombia, right, not Bolivia?
(HM) No, from Bolivia, my friend.
(PB) What's the price?
(HM) 27.5, man.
(PB) Don't you think the price is a bit high?
(IA) At 27.5k, it's not going to work, bro.
(IA) My friend, setting the price at 27.5 is going to be tough.
(PC) Why?
(IA) It's too expensive.
(IA) I think it's better to slightly lower the prices and sell everything.
(M2) My friend, at 27.5, we won't make it.
(HM) Let's go with 27.
(M2) We can easily sell them at good prices.
(PC) You're at 27k with the merchandise, right?
(PC) Has anything already been sold?
(HM) Yes, 27k, my friend. The first 50 pieces are gone.
(PC) We'll stay at 27k.
(PC) Just get rid of this merchandise.
(PC) We're going to focus on a new delivery.
(PC) Honestly, I don't ask for anything, and I don't bother with the sale, only the price metters to me, I let the other guys handle the rest.
(PC) The price is 27.
(PC) Hassan didn’t tell you?
(PC) 27k is the price, I'm not going to lower it.
(HM) Yes, I was talking with [Name withheld]. He's stuck as well.
(HM) He offered at 26.5k.
(HM) I think we should set that price as well.
(HM) Or we simply leave everything in storage for a while.
(PC) 26.5k, you won't find that anywhere.
(PC) Buddy, let's go with this price.
(HM) Alright. So, do we tell the [Name withheld] it's 26.5?
(PC) Yes, tell him.
(HM) 26.5 is fine.
(The Myx. 2023, December 9. The Hunt is On in The Netherlands | DUTCH (2) [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7usJ9eNGEO8&t=999s).
According to the above information, the selling price in Europe, particularly in the Rotterdam area, is, on average, five times higher than the purchase price in South America, representing a percentage margin of approximately 400 percent.
At the destination, cocaine shipments are unloaded at the port of entry and transported to nearby warehouses. Importers then inform wholesalers, who proceed to take steps to purchase portions of the shipments.
In any case, these transactions are not risk-free. Such criminal circles are highly dangerous and brutal. For instance, the above-mentioned Piet Costa had his followers set up a real torture chamber for his enemies and debtors. It was discovered in 2020 in a shipping container placed with others in a warehouse near Rotterdam. The presence of a dental chair (see photo below) left no doubt about the installation's horrific purpose (torture is common in such environments).
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A concrete case can enhance our understanding of the economic dimensions of large-scale drug trafficking by sea.
In September 2020, the Prosecutor's Office of Florence (Italy), under the international coordination of Europol (European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation) and Eurojust (European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation), concluded a project codenamed Los Lobos against the Albanian mafia.
During the investigation, intercepted communications revealed the purchase and resale prices of a cocaine shipment run by Albanian criminal Dritan Rexhepi, cl. 1980 (see cover photo above). He operated from the Guayaquil prison in Ecuador, where he had been incarcerated since August 2014, using encrypted cell phones. Thanks to the availability of these devices (BlackBerrys), Rexhepi appeared to be acting as a cocaine broker.
Cocaine brokers are key players in international cocaine trafficking. Traditionally employed by the 'Ndrangheta, they usually live permanently in South America, often because they are wanted in their home countries. Their duties include receiving and aggregating cocaine purchase orders, negotiating, overseeing logistics until the drugs are loaded onto ships, and ensuring payment to South American suppliers. But Rexhepi went even further. According to the Italian investigation, he convinced 14 Albanian mafia groups to form a permanent alliance to finance large-scale drug purchases. The result was the formation of a new powerful component of the Albanian mafia called Kompania Bello, a “transnational criminal federation” of Albanian groups, of which he was the top boss.
The Kompania Bello had gained such a reputation among its South American partners in crime that it had its logo stamped on bricks of cocaine, presumably from Colombia's Cartel del Norte del Valle, an ally of Mexico's Cartel de Sinaloa.
In this scenario, as reported by E. Qyno on Balkaninsight.com on Feb. 19, 2021 (https://balkaninsight.com/2021/02/19/undisputed-capo-the-albanian-behind-a-cocaine-pipeline-to-europe/), an intercepted communication disclosed all relevant numbers regarding a cocaine shipment ordered by Rexhepi. Despite a specific warning from the Italian police to Ecuadorian authorities, the shipment sailed from the Port of Guayaquil to the Port of Antwerp in January 2017. The cocaine was concealed in foam-insulated packages placed under the floors of several containers. The following excerpts from Qyno’s article help us understand the economic values involved:
“… Rexhepi had bought 371 kilos of cocaine at $4,400 per kilo for a total cost of $1.63 million, $1.2 million of which was prepaid.
The drugs could be sold to wholesalers in Europe at between 22,000 and 24,000 euros per kilo, netting Rexhepi roughly eight million euros in revenues.
(…)
The true numbers may be even higher given investigators found that the group sometimes sold up to 50 kilos per day at 27,000 euros per kilo.
Prosecutors believe the brothers’ group was active for at least three years, estimating its total turnover for that period at 210 million euros.
As for Rexhepi, prosecutors believe he trafficked at least 2,368 kilos of cocaine in 2016 and 3,654 kilos in 2017. With an average wholesale price of 23,500 euros per kilo, revenues for the two years are estimated at 141 million euros.”
Ecuadorian prison authorities released Dritan Rexhepi in January 2022, despite a 13-year prison sentence for cocaine trafficking in 2015.
As reported by A. Ford in an article published by Insightcrime.org on Nov. 18, 2022 (https://insightcrime.org/news/ecuador-prison-quietly-released-top-european-cocaine-kingpin/), the judge in Guayaquil who granted the benefits of the semi-open regime wrote, “It can clearly be appreciated that [the prisoner] has conducted himself very well. Furthermore, he made no attempts to escape.”
In any case, Rexhepi, who was wanted under an Interpol Red Notice at the request of the Italian and Albanian authorities, did not remain at large for long. Turkish police arrested him in Istanbul in November 2023, thanks to information shared with the Italian police. He had entered Turkey via Istanbul Airport using a Colombian passport and the alias Benjamin Omar Pérez GarcÃa.
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The profitability of transporting drugs by sea should now be more apparent. Several operational challenges specific to maritime transport explain the exceptional economic returns of this stage.
First, regardless of the chosen ocean route, maritime transport always involves at least two mandatory transit points: a port of loading and a port of unloading (port of entry). These are invariably the most vulnerable locations for drug seizures, as law enforcement investigations and controls are much more concentrated there. Therefore, their evasion, which requires the cooperation of internal personnel, is crucial for large-scale drug trafficking.
On the other hand, major traffickers can offer large sums of money, thanks to their huge profits. As a result, the temptation for some port workers and officials is sometimes too great to resist—not to mention the potential for complicity arising from the physical threats, which are not limited to Latin American countries. In this sense, the presence of internal accomplices is the first qualitative variable to consider when assessing a port's role and position along international drug trafficking routes.
The second qualitative variable concerns whether the port is controlled by a criminal organization, i.e., whether a criminal syndicate regulates the transit of drug shipments through the port and imposes extortion or other forms of coercion on all shipments that are not in its direct interest.
For these two qualitative variables to be positive, ports must not be marginal in the global maritime economy, as ocean container shipping lines only call at major commercial ports.
The traffic volume of specific goods shipped, including both loading and unloading, is a key indicator. A simple review of port traffic statistics, especially for bananas exported from South and Central American countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Costa Rica, is often sufficient to identify the main cocaine trafficking routes. The coca leaf is grown and processed in the same or neighbouring countries. As a result, cocaine is frequently hidden in refrigerated shipping containers and boxes of bananas, one of these countries' major exports to the West.
Moreover, the perishable nature of fruit (in this case, tropical fruits such as bananas, but also pineapples or avocados, for example) gives cocaine traffickers a significant advantage. The advantage is that port operations must be completed quickly to avoid compromising product quality. This necessity complicates drug searches by customs and police.
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In general, anyone who commits a crime faces two primary risks, regardless of its severity: being arrested and not completing the crime successfully. For a major international drug trafficker, the latter risk is having a large shipment of drugs seized by law enforcement. Having in-port accomplices reduces this risk and consequently lowers the likelihood of arrest.
Specifically, corrupt port workers and officials play an essential role in various fixed schemes designed to move drugs out of ports and to their destinations. The common feature of all these schemes is that the ocean carrier (the shipping company) is unaware that it is transporting drugs. The reference is not limited to narcotics concealed in bulk cargo or goods shipped in containers. It also includes narcotics hidden within the structure of the container, such as under the floor or in the engine compartment of refrigerated containers that transport tropical fruits.
Drug shipments can also be hidden inside or outside of ships, typically involving one or more crew members. For instance, drugs may be concealed in the rudder compartment or attached to underwater parts of the hull.
The only exception is when major traffickers themselves purchase ships to transport massive quantities. A case in point is the seizure of two and a quarter tons of cocaine aboard the Panamanian-registered M/V Matthew off the coast of Cork, southeast Ireland, on Sept. 26, 2023 (the ship had sailed from the Dutch Caribbean Islands of Aruba and Curaçao). Interestingly, the discovery of a suspicious fishing trawler nearby suggests that the traffickers intended to transfer the drugs offshore to avoid the risks associated with docking in port. Such an economically demanding method usually involves setting up a company in a Caribbean tax haven (in the above case, the Marshall Islands) that purchases a ship as its sole asset (a single-ship company).
Over the years, several high-level cocaine traffickers have developed plans, whether executed or not, to purchase ships to transport large quantities of cocaine along the South America-Europe route. Among the top names on the list is the notorious Italian cocaine broker Roberto Pannunzi (for a brief note and a photo of him, see https://www.cosanostranews.com/2023/11/mafia-excellence-inside-ndranghetas.html). In 2001, he paid cash for a Greek ship that sank off the coast of Peru before loading cocaine in Colombia and sailing to Sicily.
In 2020, Piet Costa himself intended to buy a ship in partnership with his supplier, the Colombian Clan del Golfo. The plan was to ship 25 tons of cocaine to Rotterdam using the “50 percent system" (12.5 tons purchased by the Dutch trafficker for 700 euros per kilogram and 12.5 tons transported on behalf of the Colombian cartel).
Finally, some clues suggest a connection between the infamous Irish Kinahan cartel, now based in Dubai, and the voyage of the M/V Matthew (see https://www.sundayworld.com/crime/irish-crime/cocaine-ship-mv-matthews-trail-leads-to-kinahan-cartels-uae-hideout/a688201795.html).
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In the most common cases of shipping goods by sea to conceal international drug trafficking, a key distinction is whether the formal recipient (consignee) is aware of the presence of drugs in the shipment. The ideal situation for traffickers is when the consignee is unaware. In this case, even if a random or targeted inspection uncovers a shipment of drugs, police investigators often lack the information necessary to identify the individuals responsible.
Alternatively, traffickers may use one or more front men to set up an import firm to conceal the drugs (the company must provide customs with an invoice showing the purchase from a Latin American supplier). However, in the event of a seizure, these front men can provide valuable investigative links between the drugs and the traffickers behind the shipment.
The above distinction determines the different roles required of accomplices working at the ports.
In the first scenario, the drug must be removed before the shipment reaches its destination. In the case of container-based drug trafficking, this operation typically takes place while the container of drugs is stored at the port terminal before a truck picks it up for delivery to the consignee's address.
A well-known method at this stage is the so-called "rip-on/rip-off.” It involves placing bags filled with bricks of cocaine just behind the double-door openings of shipping containers so that corrupt stevedores can easily and quickly remove them. (The photo below shows bags full of bricks of cocaine placed according to this system, discovered in a shipping container at the Port of Algeciras in July 2024.) These stevedores must then arrange for the drugs to be transported out of the port in a relatively low-risk way. They may act personally, or they may pass the bags to truck drivers or other port workers involved in the criminal scheme.
In 2017, there was a real price list for the various operations required to perform this method at the Port of Antwerp. It is no coincidence that Antwerp is the leading port in Europe for the supply of bananas (mostly from Latin America) and perishables in general.
The price list included the following items based on the different occupations of the corrupt workers (The Myx. 2022, November 24. Inside Antwerp's War on Cocaine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_RL9FZFmhUg&t=444s):
The terminal planner who, with access credentials to the port container terminal's information system, verifies and communicates the exact location of the newly arrived drug container in the terminal area: 100,000 euros.
The terminal crane operator who moves the container to the most appropriate position (for the next critical operation): 75,000 euros.
The terminal stevedore who removes the bags of drugs from the container: 1,000 euros per kilogram.
The truck driver who receives the bags to take them out of the port: 150,000 euros.
However, there are other methods besides the "rip-on/rip-off.” Europol, for instance, also mentions the "switch method" (see the report cited below). A valuable testimony collected by C. Clapson for VRT.be, published in an article dated Nov. 16, 2023, described this method in use again at the port of Antwerp (see https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/2023/11/16/antwerp-port-worker-on-drug-crime-i-could-earn-200-000 euros-i/). The source, alias Dylan, was a former crane operator who specifically operated straddle carriers. The article containing his testimony deserves to be reported in full:
For several years 'Dylan' was a crane driver in the port of Antwerp, more specifically working on straddle carriers. These cranes, also known as "elephants" in Belgium, are used to sort containers on the quayside after they have been taken off a ship by an even larger crane. "Without such drivers, drug criminals are basically nowhere," says Dylan.
He knows the modus operandi in detail. "You are given the position of a drug container via a disposable phone. You then have to go and get that container so that others can empty it," he says.
These are South American containers in which cocaine is hidden. They are put in a free space next to a European container. "Free shifting", it is called. Then the South American drugs are "thrown over" into a European container.
This is usually done by other port workers, who are also paid by drug criminals to do so. "But sometimes young guys are also smuggled into the port, in the back of a van, also for this purpose. We call them kamikazes," Dylan says. The European containers are checked much less frequently and can be driven out of the port more freely.
"This can all go very quickly but can also take a lot of time. If the drug container is at the bottom, you have to get it out. This does not go unnoticed, of course. Then there is usually someone at the planning office, who is in the business too," Dylan says.
Straddle carrier drivers are a crucial link in the drug trafficking chain. It means there is a lot of money to be made. "The first times they asked me, it was 20,000 or 25,000 euros, the last time it was already 200,000 euros and more. When they say you can make 200,000 euros in five or 10 minutes, I think practically everyone gives in to that."
When he was a crane driver, drug criminals contacted Dylan several times, often through social media. "Sometimes by colleagues, including women, from whom you really don't expect it," he says. "At one point I was in need of money and I thought: if I do it once, I'll be out of trouble. But once you've done it once, they don't let you go. Then suddenly they are there every week."
In any case, accomplices are not only found among port container terminal workers and truck drivers. Employees of shipping agencies, freight forwarders, and logistics companies are also often involved. This is especially true when the consignee is unaware that drugs have been concealed in the shipment he is expecting. In this context, another method, known as "PIN code fraud," has particularly attracted Europol's attention due to its widespread use in the Ports of Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Hamburg. In its specific report published on Mar. 30, 2023 (https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Europol_Joint-report_Criminal%20networks%20in%20EU%20ports_Public_version.pdf), such a method was described as follows:
“Misappropriation of container reference codes, also called PIN code fraud.
When a container is shipped overseas, the shipping company assigns a unique container reference code (PIN code, QR code, or other unique identifier) to each container after receiving payment for the transport. The code is used to confirm that the container can be released in the destination port and the client can pick up their container. Using mainly corruption, criminals infiltrate the companies involved in the logistics process and obtain the container reference code of the container where they know the ordered drugs are concealed. With the reference code allowing the release, the criminals retrieve the drugs container from the port terminal pretending to be the legitimate client. Once outside the port area, the drugs are extracted from the container.” (…)
“Afterwards, some criminal networks will try to deliver the container to the rightful owner. In other cases, containers are just left along the road or made to disappear.”
Criminal networks mostly receive the codes from corrupt individuals who unlawfully use the accounts of legitimate companies involved in transport and port logistics. In some cases however, they may deploy hacking or phishing. Once the criminals have the container number and the container reference code, they can gain access to detailed information about the status of the container as it is logged in the integrated and automated port data systems. They can also check if the container is present and ready for release, in order to schedule an illicit pick-up.”
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Alternatively, the drugs may be destined for recipients who are aware of the trafficking. Then, as in the previous scenario, traffickers must make every effort to reduce the likelihood of checks, inspections, and scans.
Indeed, it is true that only a few percent of shipping containers passing through ports are scanned. For instance, according to statistics from the July 2021 American Journal of Transportation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection scans only 3.7 percent of all containers entering the U.S. annually.
However, law enforcement and customs officials routinely use specific data analysis to guide their investigations. Traffickers know and fear them. Therefore, having one or more accomplices among these officials gives criminals a crucial advantage.
One such case involving customs officials occurred in February 2024 at the Port of Gioia Tauro. A police operation resulted in the arrest of two customs officials and one freight-forwarding firm employee. The three suspects were charged with aiding and abetting international drug trafficking.
According to prosecutors, the two officials and another official, who was already under investigation, "falsified the results of the X-ray scans of the containers of interest to the group, omitting to report the anomalies found during the inspections and thus allowing the containers containing cocaine to be 'released' and leave the Port of Gioia Tauro.” Specifically, one of the customs officials “acted as an intermediary between the group of cocaine 'exfiltrators' [men in charge of moving cocaine out of the port] and the group of corrupt customs officials." In this way, “he provided guidance to the criminal group on the best importation methods, which were also the most difficult for customs and law enforcement to detect.” In addition, through another suspect, “the same official advised the South American groups on the most effective methods of loading narcotics to conceal the substance from the scanner’s view.”
The arrest of these customs officials was part of a broader police project called “Tre Croci” (transl. "Three Crosses"), which was closed on Oct. 6, 2022. The project identified the first links in a supply chain of large-scale cocaine shipments from South America to Italy via the Port of Gioia Tauro. These links corresponded to two powerful criminal syndicates with specific strengths.
The first link in the chain was an organization run from Dubai by Raffaele Imperiale (cl. 1974). The Emirate authorities arrested him on Aug. 4, 2021 (see photo above), and he became a government witness shortly after his deportation to Italy. (The picture above is particularly striking because it shows some of the first actions taken by police officers immediately after Imperiale's arrest: confiscating his cell phones and demanding access codes for them.)
The Imperiale organization handled an impressive number of large cocaine shipments (four tons for this Italian project alone), which were also destined for northern European ports. For instance, between 2015 and 2016, Dutch police intercepted encrypted messages exchanged between Imperiale and one of his partners in crime. The latter was the Amsterdam-based top cocaine trafficker Ricardo Eduardo Riquelme Vega (cl. 1973), known as “El Rico” and "Rico the Chilean," who operated through the Port of Rotterdam. During this exchange of messages, which included code words, the wholesale price of cocaine would have been set at between 22,000 and 24,000 euros per kilogram.
However, to ensure the success of so many operations and to conquer new "markets"—especially that of Milan in Italy, according to the same Imperiale's testimony—the top trafficker did not hesitate to cede some of the well-remunerated functions typically performed by drug importers.
Not coincidentally, prosecutors referred to Raffaele Imperiale and his right-hand man, Bruno Carbone (cl. 1977), as "international brokers.” Their primary activities included purchasing large quantities of cocaine from South American cartels, arranging ocean freight (particularly from the Ports of Turbo, Colombia, and Cristóbal, Panama), and, in the present investigation, selling each shipment in its entirety to another criminal organization at the port of entry.
Thus, Imperiale and Carbone did not sell portions of their shipments that passed through the Port of Gioia Tauro to wholesalers. Instead, they sold each shipment at a reduced price to the same criminal group. The latter, the second link in the chain, was allegedly headed by Bartolo Bruzzaniti (cl. 1976). He belongs to the well-known group of ‘Ndrangheta blood families, Morabito-Palamara-Bruzzaniti. All of these families are linked by cross-blood ties. One member of this group is the notorious Rocco Morabito, cl. 1966 (see photo below). Morabito was last arrested in Brazil in 2021, along with the previously mentioned Vincenzo Pasquino, after more than 20 years on the run in South America.
These blood families come from the village of Africo, located in the 'Ndrangheta macro area that represents the Ionian side (see the macrostructure of the 'Ndrangheta in Reggio Calabria province in https://www.cosanostranews.com/2020/12/ndrangheta-in-greater-toronto-area.html). This second organization had the following strengths:
Strong connections at the Port of Gioia Tauro, which were essential for the transit of cocaine. (Without membership or connections to the 'Ndrangheta, it is simply unimaginable to import drug shipments through the Port of Gioia Tauro, just as, to give another example, it is equally inconceivable to think of smuggling drugs through any Albanian port without the direct involvement of the Albanian mafia.) The following statement, reported by Bruno Carbone to the prosecutors, is very revealing in this regard: "The Port of Gioia Tauro was under the command of the Bruzzanitis." (Even Carbone became a government witness after he was arrested in March 2022 in Syria, specifically in the Idlib governorate, which was then held by Islamic factions at war with the Assad regime, and deported to Italy via Turkey.) In this scenario, Bartolo Bruzzaniti would have assumed all the risks associated with the transit of cocaine shipments through the port and their subsequent transportation to external depots. ('Ndrangheta members often hide loads of cocaine underground while they wait to resell and deliver individual batches.) According to the agreed division of activities between the two parties, taking on these responsibilities would have entailed paying the Imperiale organization a correspondingly lower price. However, the balance of power between the two was not in question. Bartolo Bruzzaniti called Raffaele Imperiale "the strongest in the world."
Its historical specialization in international drug trafficking, particularly in supplying the Milan area (one of Italy’s most lucrative cocaine trafficking markets). “70 percent of the wholesalers in Milan have all been friends of mine for 30 years,” Bartolo Bruzzaniti wrote via the Canadian encrypted messenger service Sky ECC. He planned to sell 300 kilograms of cocaine "per month" at the price of "34,000 euros per kilogram." In this way, Bruzzaniti aimed to become the only supplier in the area, “because I have a right to it.” (This last statement sums up the essence of the 'Ndrangheta blood families' criminal power: it remains deeply rooted and unchallenged as they pass control of specific criminal activities from generation to generation.)
The first strength listed above was of paramount importance. Although both organizations were major players in international drug trafficking, the success of their alliance depended largely on this crucial resource. Bruzzaniti's connections to an organized group of 14 port terminal containers and customs personnel working for drug traffickers ensured the availability of such a resource. On the day the investigation concluded, the Guardia di Finanza—an Italian military police force—issued a press release summarizing the investigation and particularly highlighting the role of accomplices at the port, as follows:
“… the operation enabled the dismantling of a sophisticated criminal organization in the Port of Gioia Tauro. It would have ensured both the recovery of large shipments of narcotics arriving on cargo ships from South America and their subsequent storage in "safe" warehouses.
The organization, which would have provided the logistics for drug trafficking as if it were a real service company, was structured on three different levels of individuals involved:
-Members of the main 'Ndrangheta blood families, who were able to ensure the importation of cocaine shipments arriving from South America;
-Supervisors of teams of corrupt port workers, who would have paid the team with a part of the "commission” received from the clients, ranging from 7 to 20 percent of the value of the shipment (the reconstructed payments would amount to more than 7 million euros);
-Port terminal workers, who were responsible for physically removing the cocaine from the "contaminated" container and moving it to safe locations.
The operation revealed the detailed organization of the drug traffickers, who communicated with each other using encrypted cell phones.
The meticulous reconstruction would have revealed that once the South American suppliers communicated to the local representatives the name of the arriving ship and the container containing the narcotics [communicating its unique identification code], the importation passed under the supervision of the involved port terminal workers. They took steps to ensure that the "contaminated" container was unloaded at the right time and positioned in the agreed-upon location. Once available, the team of corrupt terminal container workers placed the container in a "safe" area. This area was specifically chosen so that the container could be opened and the narcotics transferred to a second container (usually referred to by the suspects as the "exit"). The latter was picked up in the following hours by a complicit carrier and delivered to the location suggested by the organization's supervisors.
Reconstructing the complex phase of container movement within the port would have disclosed the method of drug transshipment used by the port terminal workers. They called it the "bridge" system. Specifically, after selecting a suitable landing area for the scope, the "contaminated" container was positioned in front of the "exit" container, leaving only the distance between them necessary to open the doors for the movement of the illicit goods.
A third container—called the "bridge"—was then placed on top of the previous two to conceal the operations on the lower level, even from above.
Once the area was prepared, corrupt stevedores were transported to the site, hidden in a fourth container to avoid suspicion. This was placed in the same row where the structure had been erected.
Finally, to prevent outsiders from interfering with the illegal operations, two straddle carriers (specialized container handling vehicles) driven by the suspects were stopped on either side of the row of containers where the bridge had been built. The purpose was to deny access and monitor the possible arrival of law enforcement from above.
After all the operations were completed, counterfeit seals were applied to the containers. A "clone" seal was placed on the container arriving from South America. This was sent by the same supplier organization and concealed in one of the packages containing the narcotics. At the same time, a counterfeit seal prepared by the criminal group responsible for recovering the drugs was placed on the "exit" container.
The involvement of an official of the Gioia Tauro Customs Office—Anti-Fraud and Control Section (who has been placed under precautionary arrest) has also come to light.
In order to benefit the criminal organization under investigation, this official allegedly took advantage of his duties during scheduled inspections to alter the results of an X-ray scan of a container containing 300 kilograms of cocaine. The alteration consisted of obscuring the anomalies found and ensuring that the scan matched the declared cargo. The customs official would have been compensated for his actions with 3 percent of the value of the illegal cargo.
This investigation also led to the identification of the individuals responsible for planning and executing a large-scale drug trafficking operation from South America to Calabria. The plan involved regular and massive drug imports of approximately 2 tons at a time.
To evade controls, on one occasion, the Calabrian suspects would have devised and requested specific methods of concealing the narcotics from Colombian suppliers. To this end, the suspects sent actual diagrams suggesting the most appropriate load distribution using the drawn representation of the container. The concealment plan in question was to place four bricks of cocaine in each box of the "cover cargo" (bananas) except for the first and last rows of boxes. The latter were not "contaminated" because they could be more easily inspected. Nevertheless, the shipment, which contained approximately 1,920 bricks of cocaine and was designed to evade scanner detection, was intercepted and seized by the Guardia di Finanza.”
(https://www.gdf.gov.it/it/gdf-comunica/notizie-ed-eventi/comunicati-stampa/anno-2022/ottobre/2018ndrangheta-smantellata-la-201clogistica-del-narcotraffico201d-nel-porto-di-gioia-tauro).
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Once again, the importance—or rather the necessity—for international drug traffickers to have corrupt workers and port officials on their payroll is evident.
However, the overall criminal picture is not complete in this case. One final explanation is important because it relates to the concept of control over a port.
As mentioned above, the Bruzzanitis are a blood family from a village in the 'Ndrangheta macro area that covers the Ionian side. The Port of Gioia Tauro, on the other hand, is in the 'Ndrangheta macro area, which encompasses the Tyrrhenian side. This implies that other ‘Ndrangheta blood families, grouped in different locali (pl.), command the territory where the port is located (for the term locale, see https://www.cosanostranews.com/2023/11/mafia-excellence-inside-ndranghetas.html). In such a scenario, the latter evidently permitted the Bruzzanitis to operate in the port, given their notorious criminal reputation and connections with corrupt personnel.
However, this availability almost certainly came at a cost, as the principle of territoriality could not be challenged. According to this principle, the locali (pl.) are sovereign over their respective territories. Therefore, they are entitled to impose extortion for any legal and, even more so, illegal activity conducted by anyone within their territory. This fundamental rule also applies to all 'Ndrangheta components when operating outside their boundaries and within those of other clans. It is necessary to maintain order and prevent dangerous disputes. Likewise, a company connected to a Sicilian Cosa Nostra mafia family that wants to operate in Calabria must also pay extortion, like all the others (this rule also applies in reverse, of course).
It is now understandable why authorized drug importers at the Port of Gioia Tauro face a double payment obligation. In addition to paying corrupt port workers and officials, they must also bear the cost of extortion. Although these two payments—whether made in cash or in kind—are theoretically separate, they are collected by the same prominent figures. These individuals then manage the distribution of rewards based on the criminal status and roles of those involved.
This system was well explained to prosecutors by a high-ranking ‘Ndrangheta member, Antonino Belnome (cl. 1972), Capo Locale in the Milan area with the rank of Padrino, who became a government witness in 2010 after his arrest (Antonino Belnome is the killer of Carmelo Novella, see https://www.cosanostranews.com/2021/07/ndrangheta-dynamics-in-greater-toronto.html):
“I was at a high level of the 'Ndrangheta, and, at that level, it was known that the Port of Gioia Tauro was the prerogative of the Mancuso, Pesce, and Bellocco blood families [the most powerful blood families rooted on the Tyrrhenian side] and that to import cocaine, you had to go through them.” (…)
“A few days before my arrest [in July 2010], a shipment of 400 kilograms of cocaine arrived in Gioia Tauro. When a large quantity arrives, the most important families are contacted for possible distribution, and we [his mother-Locale in Calabria] were also contacted.” (…)
"The Pesce, Bellocco, and Mancuso blood families control the cocaine trafficking that arrives in Gioia Tauro, also because these families have direct sources of supply. When I spoke to Mimmo [a member of the Bellocco blood family] about purchasing a big load of cocaine, he told me that 30 percent had to remain with them anyway, either in drugs or cash. Thirty percent had to remain with the Belloccos because they would then take care of the “port issue,” which meant paying the corrupt Guardia di Finanza officials. Obviously, Mimmo was speaking as a representative of the Belloccos and not in any other capacity. It would have been the same if I had known any Pesces or Mancusos representatives. But I knew the Belloccos.”
(https://www.quotidianodelsud.it/archivio/2013/11/20/tutti-sotto-processo-gli-affiliati-a-clan-belloccopentito-svela-traffici-attorno-al-porto-di-gioia-tauro)
The key point is that controlling a given territory also means controlling the port within it. Consequently, single or repeated police operations against corrupt dockworkers and major traffickers do not undermine control of the port. This situation will continue as long as one or more criminal organizations dominate their territory of reference, which includes the port.
In any case, extortion of all drug shipments in transit is not the only form of coercion; there may be others, both additional and substitutive. Another remarkable testimony, that of the already mentioned 'Ndrangheta cocaine broker Vincenzo Pasquino, provides an example in this regard, again concerning the Port of Gioia Tauro:
“A Calabrian family that sends a shipment of cocaine to Gioia Tauro must inform the others. [In this testimony, as in the one above, the term "family" can be understood as clan (s.). This can be defined as a dominant criminal blood family extended to various individuals and other blood families based on both familial and non-familial ties. One or more clans (pl.) or blood families form a locale of ‘Ndrangheta (s.), which controls a specific territory.] Only if important families are not interested in buying a share of the cargo can it be offered to others. Those who do not respect this rule risk being killed or "stripped," in the sense of being excluded from any business dealings or being deprived of protection.”
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After reviewing a few cases, it can be concluded that drug traffickers' accomplices perform different tasks at the port. In any case, they operate in close coordination during their illegal activities.
The main occupations are:
Dockworkers and employers in port terminals.
Police, customs, public, and security officials.
Truck drivers.
Employees of shipping agencies, freight forwarders, and logistics companies.
Other occupations related in some way to the port economy.
However, networks of complicity, large or small, are unlikely to last long in ports, as they are periodically dismantled by law enforcement. Essentially, these networks follow a never-ending cycle of formation, destruction, and (often) reconstruction with other individuals.
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On the other hand, not having accomplices in the port is risky. In addition to random checks, police intelligence has improved significantly. Increased cooperation and information sharing among law enforcement agencies from different countries has made this possible. But even in this scenario, an explanation is needed.
Sometimes, police intelligence uncovers information about drug shipments in transit. This is principally achieved through communications intercepts. The problem is that in international container-based drug trafficking, knowledge of a specific piece of information—the unique identification code assigned to each container—is essential to making a seizure. If the communication containing this code is not intercepted, law enforcement efforts are unlikely to succeed because there is no specific container to target. Indeed, even if there is a strong suspicion that a drug shipment is in transit, it remains physically impossible for police to inspect every container arriving at a grand port in a given period without precise information. Such a control operation, regardless of its feasibility, would block part of the port’s activities for several days, causing unacceptable damage to the port's economy.
In any case, the specific context of reference remains risky for drug traffickers without internal accomplices. This is due to the complexities and peculiarities associated with importing and exporting goods through ports.
Overseas shipments involve parties from distant countries. In addition, each port has its own set of operational, documentation, and permitting procedures. These procedures often lead to major and minor complications that require quick resolution. But even simple working practices can cause problems. They also increase the likelihood that something will go wrong for drug traffickers, i.e., that drug shipments will be discovered by law enforcement or stolen by other criminals (the latter possibility is not uncommon).
Consider, for example, a 2007 story about an unexpected phone call from a female Melbourne-based freight forwarder. The woman needed to notify an unaware company that a container had arrived at the port for pickup. On this occasion, she did not call the fake number listed on the shipping documents, which in reality belonged to the traffickers (likely due to at least one accomplice at the port of departure). Instead, she searched for the company's phone number on Google, where she found the real one.
This unexpected behaviour led to the arrest of an entire criminal organization operating in Australia, headed by the Calabrian Pasquale Barbaro, cl. 1961 (see photo below). The group was identified as the final recipient of a massive drug shipment (4.4 tons of ecstasy pills) to the 'Ndrangheta from northern European suppliers, most likely Belgians. (The production of synthetic drugs for the European market, but also for more distant destinations, as in the present case, has traditionally been concentrated in the Netherlands and Belgium.)
The shipment of pills, concealed within cans of tomato sauce packed in a container formally destined for an unwitting company, had travelled from the Port of Naples to the Port of Melbourne, where it was seized (see the Special Report by K. Moor for the Herald Sun dated Feb. 13, 2015:
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At the port of entry, major drug traffickers may pay corrupt port workers and officials in cash, often at predetermined rates. This method of payment is typically used when the latter are limited in number and organization.
However, traffickers may also pay in kind, leaving behind approximately 25 percent of the total weight of each drug shipment. This second method of payment is common when the port personnel themselves form an articulated criminal organization.
On the other hand, the possession and sale of large quantities of drugs is a serious issue. In such ruthless environments, with so much money at stake, any mistake can lead to a death sentence. As a result, the high criminal level of those involved—and the risk of arrest—are constant sources of concern.
Elaborate activities must be carried out. They require a strong organization with numerous members. In Western countries, after port operations, these activities usually include:
Storing large quantities of drugs and protecting them from other criminals;
Organizing and carrying out dangerous drug-for-money exchanges and transactions;
Money laundering;
Implementing measures to evade possible (and likely) police investigations;
Directly organizing and managing the importation of large shipments of drugs through direct connections with Latin American suppliers.
The following is an example of a sophisticated criminal organization operating in a port. It possessed the resources to function as a service provider for drug traffickers. However, it also evolved into an organization directly involved in international drug trafficking before being dismantled in July 2014, again in the Port of Gioia Tauro (Project Puerto Liberado). Below is an excerpt from the Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia's (DDA) press release at the time:
“… it was ascertained that the group headed by the BRANDIMARTE blood family could be compared to a real service company. Its specialty was the management and reception of cocaine shipments arriving from South America through the Calabrian port [Gioia Tauro].
Technical intercepts revealed that the organization received a portion of the imported cargo as compensation. This portion varied depending on the criminal-specific weight of the importing clan and ranged from 10 to 30 percent of the total cargo. It was also ascertained that, given the lucrative nature of drug trafficking, the organization had, in some cases, invested in the importation of cocaine. To this end, it sent its members to negotiate directly with South American narcos.
Following the numerous cocaine seizures made by Guardia di Finanza personnel operating in the port, investigations also revealed that drug traffickers constantly refine their techniques to evade customs controls. In one case, a complex alphanumeric code was intercepted during communications between associates, each having their own "cover" name. Using this code, corrupt port personnel received the essential information they needed [the ship name and the container code] to identify the ship and the container carrying the narcotics.”
(https://www.zmedia.it/operazione-puerto-liberado-tutti-i-dettagli-sugli-arresti-a-gioia-tauro/).
Finally, one last point. There are cases in which major traffickers extend the value chain of the drugs they smuggle. This further step consists of setting up a chemical laboratory relatively close to the port of entry to process and refine raw cocaine. Recent examples include the laboratories discovered by law enforcement:
In April 2023, in an isolated villa in Pontevedra province, in the Galicia region of Spain. The facility was the result of a joint venture between a Colombian and a Mexican cartel, both of which provided the chemists and experts in processing, along with a Spanish criminal organization. The Spanish police seized 151 kilograms of cocaine ready for distribution, 1,300 kilograms of base paste, 23,000 litres of precursors, and 4 tons of solid chemicals. 18 people were arrested. During the operation's press conference, an officer disclosed what appeared to be the price established for wholesalers, ranging from 27,000 to 32,000 euros ($30,000 to $35,000) per kilogram.
In April 2025, in a rural building (see photo below) located in the countryside of the village of Rizziconi, 7 km from Gioia Tauro, and still strategically close to important communication routes. A total of 100 kilograms of pure cocaine, divided into blocks, was discovered in an attic cavity. In addition, according to the press release issued by the Carabinieri (another Italian military police force), “precision instruments, chemical compounds, high-temperature ovens, protective suits, masks, and everything necessary to process and refine raw cocaine” were found in the same building. (https://www.carabinieri.it/in-vostro-aiuto/informazioni/comunicati-stampa/scoperta-raffineria-di-cocaina-a-rizziconi-(rc)-sequestrati-oltre-100-chili-di-droga-purissima.-il-casolare-era-un-laboratorio-chimico-attrezzato).
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References to various police operations against international drug trafficking involving personnel and officers at ports, in particular at the Port of Gioia Tauro, provide an opportunity to present information and explanations regarding the two qualitative variables mentioned above, which are of general value. They may be summarized as follows:
For drug shipments to transit continuously, the first qualitative variable—the possible presence of internal accomplices in a port—must be positive (i.e., the accomplices must be there). However, this variable does not remain stable over time because periodic law enforcement operations remove all or most of the international drug traffickers' accomplices (the variable drops to zero or significantly reduces its relevance).
On the contrary, the second qualitative variable, which refers to the possibility for a criminal organization to exert control over a port, remains stable over time. This stability follows the initial shift from zero when the criminal organization first takes control. From that point on, stability is maintained because dismantling the often deeply entrenched control of a port is very difficult for law enforcement. At most, a criminal organization may lose it, but only to a more powerful one that seizes this crucial asset by force. Thus, acquiring control of a port can be a key factor in explaining a criminal organization's significant increase in power. As an example of this, with regard to the Brazilian Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), we can cite G. Feltran, I. Vianna Pinho, and L. Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo in “Atlantic connections – The PCC and the Brazil-West Africa cocaine trade” (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023), who wrote as follows:
“The year 2014 marked a critical turning point for the PCC as it pivoted away from domestic [cocaine] sales and set its sights on the more lucrative export market. Key to this strategic shift was cementing its influence over the all-important Port of Santos.” (…)
“There were two critical stages in the PCC’s expansion – taking control of the Port of Santos in 2014 and the border with Paraguay in 2016.”
As for the relationship between the two variables, the second affects the first. The reason is that a criminal organization controlling a port has extensive local resources in and around it. These resources enable criminals to more easily and quickly replace individuals and connections that are periodically disrupted by law enforcement. In the absence of control, reconstruction processes take longer, if they occur at all. As a result, the complete elimination of complicity with drug traffickers in a controlled port is rare and short-lived. Instead, the possible presence of accomplices in an uncontrolled port is often only temporary, although newly available individuals may reestablish it over time.
In terms of drug trafficking volumes, not controlled ports have a significant competitive advantage over controlled ports. This is because, in the latter:
The criminal organization that exerts control denies access to others or permits access only to a few. These restrictions serve two purposes: to exclude potentially dangerous competitors and to reduce the risk of further attracting the attention of law enforcement. Consider, for instance, the alleged long-established ban by the Rizzuto crime family (Montreal family) on ‘Ndrangheta members using the Port of Montreal.
Traffickers from other criminal organizations (if authorized) or, in certain contexts, subunits of the same organization, must pay an extortion fee based on the value of drug shipments in transit. They may also be subject to further forms of coercion. Thus, given the choice, any large drug trafficker will prefer to use a port where the only cost is the payment of internal accomplices and no other expenses. Nevertheless, a trafficker may still opt to transit his drug shipment through a controlled port. A lack of alternatives—caused by the absence of criminal connections at other ports of entry along the maritime routes of interest—may drive this decision. However, it may also be motivated by the trafficker’s willingness to pay more for a safer transit of his narcotics. Illegal services offered to evade controls and inspections are, on average, more reliable and efficient in ports under criminal control.
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The last example concerns a "criminal network" dismantled in the Port of Algeciras in June 2021. This type of organization consists of multiple members with operational roles and bosses. The bosses are often in a position to negotiate on an equal, or almost equal, footing with the top international traffickers to whom they offer drug smuggling services. Here is how Europol presented the police operation in a press release:
“The Spanish Guardia Civil, with the support of Europol and its European Economic and Financial Crime Centre (EFECC), dismantled a criminal network that trafficked cocaine from South America to the Port of Algeciras in Spain. The network was capable of controlling the maritime traffic of containers arriving from South America.
The network consisted of different employees who worked in various areas at the Port of Algeciras. These employees included a worker from a port container terminal, two workers from the Border Inspection Post, four from Auxiliary Maritime Services (SAM), and several stevedores, freight forwarders, consignees, and carriers.
As a result of the operation:
29 people have been arrested;
More than 1 600 kg of cocaine has been seized;
More than € 16.5 million has been seized.
The Guardia Civil initiated the investigation in August 2020. On 29 April this year, intelligence was received suggesting the criminal network intended to introduce a large consignment of cocaine hidden among frozen mackerel and directed towards the Port of Algeciras.
Rumours circulate in the criminal underworld about an organization or individuals who facilitate the exit of drug shipments from a port. Major traffickers do not hesitate to hire these people, often at predetermined rates. They provide various illegal services that significantly reduce the risk of drug seizures. As such, these services are essential to the success of a highly profitable criminal enterprise.
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